Challenger, 1986: the O-ring warnings NASA heard the night before launch
Morton Thiokol engineers warned that cold could stop Challenger’s booster seals working; the company reversed its advice overnight, and on January 28, 1986, the shuttle broke apart after 73 seconds.
What’s claimed
The loss of the space shuttle Challenger on mission STS-51-L (also written 51-L), on January 28, 1986, is often told as a story of warnings ignored: engineers knew the boosters could fail in the cold, said so the night before, and were overruled. Some go further and call it a cover-up. A separate, painful question has lingered too: whether the seven astronauts died at once.
What’s on the record
Challenger broke apart 73 seconds after liftoff from Kennedy Space Center. NASA lists the crew as commander Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, pilot Michael J. Smith, mission specialists Judith A. Resnik, Ellison S. Onizuka and Ronald E. McNair, teacher in space S. Christa McAuliffe and payload specialist Gregory B. Jarvis. The cause was the failure of an O-ring seal in a joint of the right solid rocket booster, made worse by unusually cold weather.
The danger was known in writing. About six months earlier, Morton Thiokol engineer Roger Boisjoly warned managers in a memo of “a catastrophe of the highest order” involving “loss of human life,” NPR reported. In July 1985, after a secondary O-ring showed erosion on an earlier flight, a launch constraint was placed on the boosters; the presidential commission found such constraints had been imposed and regularly waived at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center.
On January 27, 1986, the forecast for launch time was as low as 30 °F (about −1 °C). In a teleconference that evening, Thiokol engineers presented charts on O-ring erosion and recommended against launching below 53 °F (about 12 °C). Boisjoly testified that he “expressed deep concern about launching at low temperature.” During an off-line caucus, a senior Thiokol manager asked the company’s engineering vice-president to “take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat.” Thiokol faxed a recommendation to launch at about 11:45 p.m.
The presidential commission, known as the Rogers Commission, reported on June 6, 1986, that the decision to launch was flawed. Those who made it did not know the recent history of O-ring problems, the contractor’s initial written recommendation against launching below 53 °F, or the continuing opposition of Thiokol’s engineers. A Marshall project manager testified that he had decided not to raise the concerns to the next level of the program.
Commission member Richard Feynman, a Nobel physicist, dropped a piece of O-ring material into ice water during a hearing to show how it lost its springiness in the cold. In his appendix he noted that estimates of a catastrophic failure ranged from about 1 in 100, from working engineers, to 1 in 100,000, from management, and concluded: “reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”
The other side
The record does not support a cover-up of the cause: the commission published the warnings, the teleconference testimony and Feynman’s dissent. On the crew, NASA’s report of July 28, 1986, found the cause of death could not be positively determined. Of four emergency air packs recovered, three had been switched on, and investigators said a loss of cabin pressure, causing rapid unconsciousness, was possible but not certain.
Still open
NASA’s 1986 report found that the crew’s cause of death could not be positively determined. Three of the four recovered emergency air packs had been switched on, and investigators said a loss of cabin pressure causing rapid unconsciousness was possible but not certain. The commission also heard that a Marshall project manager decided not to raise the engineers’ concerns to the next level; what those above him would have done with them, nobody can now say.
Where it stands (for now)
Declassified. The engineers’ warnings, the overnight reversal and the flawed decision are all set out in the presidential commission’s own report and in NASA’s records. Investigators published them rather than buried them; what remains unknown is exactly how the crew’s last moments unfolded.
Sources
- Document STS-51L · NASA
- Document Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Chapter V: The Contributing Cause of the Accident · NASA History (Rogers Commission, 1986) · June 5, 1986
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Document
Appendix F: Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle (R. P. Feynman)
· NASA History (Rogers Commission, 1986) · June 5, 1986
“For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.” - Document Challenger Crew Report · NASA · July 27, 1986
- News Remembering Roger Boisjoly: He Tried To Stop Shuttle Challenger Launch · NPR · Feb. 5, 2012
- News 1986: The Challenger Explosion · American Physical Society (APS News) · Dec. 31, 2000
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