Corporate cover-ups

The Ford Pinto memo: what Ford’s famous cost-benefit analysis actually covered

Mother Jones said in 1977 that Ford valued a life at $200,000 rather than fix the Pinto. The memo itself priced a rollover rule for the whole industry, and how dangerous the Pinto was is still argued.

Under ReviewSerious people argue both sides; the evidence cuts both ways, and the file stays open.

Published Oct. 10, 2026Last checked Oct. 11, 2026

What’s claimed

The Ford Pinto story is a staple of business-ethics classes. Ford, it goes, knew the compact car’s gas tank could rupture and burn in rear-end crashes, calculated that paying for deaths and injuries would cost less than an $11-per-car fix, and chose to pay. The proof usually offered is a cost-benefit memo that put a price of $200,000 on a human life.

What’s on the record

The claim took hold with “Pinto Madness,” Mark Dowie’s article in the September/October 1977 issue of Mother Jones. Dowie estimated that Pinto crashes had caused at least 500 burn deaths, possibly 900, and wrote that an internal Ford memo argued against an $11-per-car improvement that would prevent 180 burn deaths a year. Ford’s director of automotive safety, he reported, had attached it to a letter to the US Department of Transportation.

The memo is real, and the Center for Auto Safety publishes it. Titled “Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires,” by E. S. Grush and C. S. Saunby of Ford’s environmental and safety engineering office, it responds to proposed federal rules on fuel-system integrity. Its $11 is Ford’s estimated cost, per passenger car and per light truck, of meeting the static rollover portion of the proposed standard, applied across the industry to 11 million cars and 1.5 million light trucks a year. The $200,000 is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s own estimate of the cost of a death. Its authors stated that the analysis “concerns only rollover consequences and costs.”

The Pinto’s fuel-tank problem was separate, and real. Months after Dowie’s article, an Orange County, California, jury awarded Richard Grimshaw, burned as a passenger in a 1971 Pinto struck at about 28 mph (45 km/h), US$125 million in punitive damages; the trial judge cut it to US$3.5 million. On June 9, 1978, after federal crash tests showed tank ruptures and leaks, Ford agreed to recall 1.5 million Pintos and 30,000 Mercury Bobcats. That August three teenagers, Judy and Lyn Ulrich and their cousin Donna, died when a van hit their 1973 Pinto near Elkhart, Indiana. Ford was charged with reckless homicide. On March 13, 1980, the jury acquitted.

What doesn’t add up

The document at the heart of the legend is a rollover analysis covering every car and light truck sold, submitted to regulators, not a decision about the Pinto’s rear-mounted tank. The legal scholar Gary T. Schwartz, in his law-review article “The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case,” found that in 1975 and 1976 Pintos made up 1.9 per cent of cars on the road and 1.9 per cent of fatal fires, though 4.1 per cent of deaths in rear-collision fires, The New Yorker reported. It also reported that NHTSA counted about two dozen Pinto and Bobcat occupants killed by fires from rear collisions in the cars’ first seven years, far below Mother Jones’s estimate. At the Indiana trial the defence argued the van had been going close to 50 mph (80 km/h). Against that, a former Ford recall officer recalled internal tests showing the Pinto’s tank ruptured at lower crash speeds than its rivals’ did.

Still open

How much more dangerous the Pinto was than its rivals is still argued. NHTSA counted about two dozen rear-collision fire deaths in its first seven years; Mother Jones estimated at least 500. Schwartz’s figures show Pintos over-represented in rear-collision fires but not in fatal fires overall. The internal tests showing the tank rupturing at lower speeds than rivals’ are known here through a former Ford recall officer’s recollection.

Where it stands (for now)

Under Review. The Pinto’s fuel-tank weakness, the 1978 recall and the Grimshaw verdict are documented. The popular claim that Ford’s memo weighed Pinto deaths against a Pinto fix does not match the memo itself, which priced a rollover rule for the whole industry, and how much more dangerous the car really was remains argued.

Sources

  1. News Pinto Madness · Mother Jones (Mark Dowie)
  2. Document Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires (Ford memo by E. S. Grush and C. S. Saunby) · Center for Auto Safety
    “The analysis discussed above concerns only rollover consequences and costs.”
  3. Source Ford Pinto Fuel Tank · Center for Auto Safety · Nov. 12, 2009
  4. News How Do We Build a Safer Car? · The New Yorker · May 3, 2015

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