Project Azorian: the CIA, Howard Hughes’s ‘mining ship’ and a sunken Soviet submarine
In 1974 the CIA used a ship presented as a Howard Hughes deep-sea mining venture to lift part of a sunken Soviet missile submarine, and its refusal to talk about it gave the world the phrase "neither confirm nor deny."
What’s claimed
For years after the story broke in 1975, the Hughes Glomar Explorer stood for the idea that the US government hides its biggest secrets in plain sight. The ship was presented as Howard Hughes’s venture to mine the deep-sea floor. Rumours swirled about what it had really been doing in the middle of the Pacific, what it had brought up, and why the CIA would say only that it could neither confirm nor deny. Some later books went further and argued that the Soviet submarine at the centre of the story had gone rogue before it sank.
What’s on the record
The submarine was the K-129, a Soviet Golf-class boat carrying nuclear missiles, lost with its crew in early 1968 roughly 1,500 miles (about 2,400 kilometres) northwest of Hawaii. A review in the CIA’s journal Studies in Intelligence puts the wreck at nearly 17,000 feet and 2,000 tons; until then, the deepest ship salvage on record had been from 245 feet.
The CIA called the recovery Project AZORIAN. (JENNIFER, the name early books used, was only its security compartment.) Global Marine, a California firm, oversaw the ship’s construction; the Hughes companies supplied the cover story of a seabed-mining venture. Lockheed’s Skunk Works built a giant claw, which was hidden in a submersible barge and taken into the ship through its "moon pool" at night off Catalina Island.
President Richard Nixon approved the mission on June 7, 1974. On August 8, according to the National Security Archive, the ship raised a portion of the K-129. Only a portion: the CIA review says that more than 6,700 feet up, two of the claw’s grabber arms snapped and nearly 100 feet of the section fell back to the bottom, taking a missile and possibly cryptographic equipment with it. The remains of several Soviet crewmen found in the wreckage were buried at sea, and a videotape of that burial was later declassified. Two Soviet vessels, one a naval tug that came within 200 yards, watched the operation without realizing what they were seeing.
The secret held until February 1975, when the Los Angeles Times reported a burglary at a Hughes company office. Columnist Jack Anderson broadcast the story on March 18, 1975, and Seymour Hersh’s account ran in The New York Times the next day. The White House then cancelled a second mission, MATADOR, to go back for the rest.
Journalist Harriet Ann Phillippi then asked, under the Freedom of Information Act, for CIA records of its efforts to keep the story out of the media. The agency said it could neither confirm nor deny that such records existed. On November 16, 1976, the US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit sent the case back and required the CIA to justify that answer in a public affidavit, in as much detail as possible. The "Glomar response" has been a fixture of secrecy law ever since.
What doesn’t add up
The CIA declassified an internal history of the project only in 2010, and with redactions. The National Security Archive notes that the agency would not release even the cost overruns; outside estimates run as high as $500 million in 1974 dollars. Exactly what the recovered section yielded is still not public. The rogue-submarine theory fares worse: the CIA reviewer lists it among several unlikely scenarios, and the historians Norman Polmar and Michael White conclude the boat probably sank after the rocket engines of two of its missiles ignited for unknown reasons.
Still open
The CIA declassified its internal history only in 2010, with redactions, and still won’t release even the cost overruns; outside estimates run as high as $500 million in 1974 dollars. Exactly what the recovered section yielded is still not public. The second mission, MATADOR, was cancelled, so the section that fell back, with a missile and possibly cryptographic equipment, stayed on the bottom as far as the record shows.
Where it stands (for now)
Declassified. The purpose-built ship, the Hughes cover story, the partial recovery and the origin of the Glomar response are all in the CIA’s own publications and a federal appeals court ruling. What the agency still withholds is the bill and the payoff.
Sources
- Document Project Azorian: The CIA’s Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer · National Security Archive (George Washington University) · Feb. 11, 2010
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Document
The Glomar Explorer in Film and Print (review by David Robarge, Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 1)
· Central Intelligence Agency
“The "neither confirm nor deny" phrase the Agency uses when responding to document search requests has come to be known in information management parlance as the "Glomar response."” - Document Phillippi v. Central Intelligence Agency, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976) · US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (via Public.Resource.Org) · Nov. 15, 1976
- Source What the FOIA is GLOMAR?! · The FOIA Ombudsman (US National Archives) · Jan. 24, 2024
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