Stingrays: police cell-site simulators and the FBI’s non-disclosure agreements
Police fake cell towers, called stingrays, pull in every phone nearby. FBI secrecy agreements told departments to drop cases rather than reveal them, and the RCMP used them without warrants.
What’s claimed
Police across North America, the claim goes, carry fake cell towers that trick every phone nearby into connecting and giving itself away, and the FBI has made them promise to keep the devices secret, even from judges, even if that means dropping a criminal case.
What’s on the record
The devices are real, and so is the secrecy. The US Justice Department’s 2015 policy explains how a cell-site simulator works: it transmits as a cell tower, phones nearby treat it as the most attractive tower and send it their identifying numbers, and the operator picks out the target from among them. The policy says the department’s devices must be set up so they cannot collect the content of calls, texts or other data on the phone.
In April 2015 the New York Civil Liberties Union published records from the Erie County Sheriff’s Office, near Buffalo, released after a state court ordered it. They showed the office used stingrays at least 47 times between May 2010 and October 2014, and obtained a court order only once, a lower-level pen register order rather than a warrant. Its confidentiality agreement with the FBI required near-total secrecy, including in court, and allowed the FBI to ask the office to drop prosecutions rather than reveal how the device was used.
The same month the Associated Press reported that Baltimore police had used the Hailstorm and similar devices about 4,300 times since 2007. A detective testified that the department’s agreement with the FBI instructed officers to withhold evidence even under a court order, and that he had not complied with a subpoena to bring the device to court. A judge had earlier told police that the court had no non-disclosure agreement with them.
On 3 September 2015 the Justice Department announced that federal agents would generally need a warrant based on probable cause, must explain the technology to judges, and must delete bystanders’ data at least daily when hunting a known phone. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates said she expected the FBI to revise its non-disclosure agreements. The ACLU pointed out that the policy did not reach most state and local police.
Canada has its own record. After first refusing to confirm it used the devices, the RCMP held a technical briefing on them in April 2017. The federal Privacy Commissioner then reported that the RCMP had used them, under the name mobile device identifiers, in 125 criminal investigations from 2011 to 2016. Six deployments, between March and June 2015, had neither a warrant nor an emergency to justify them, and the Commissioner found they did not comply with the Charter or the Privacy Act.
What doesn’t add up
Some fears go further than the documents. The Justice Department says its devices cannot capture content, and the Privacy Commissioner says it verified the same for the RCMP’s. Whether every local department’s equipment is configured that way is harder to know, which is exactly the critics’ point about secrecy. The clause allowing cases to be dropped is documented; how often it was actually used is not fully known.
Still open
How often the FBI’s agreements actually led prosecutors to drop a case is not fully known. Whether every local department’s equipment is set so it cannot capture content is hard to check, because the same secrecy keeps the devices out of court. The 2015 federal policy did not reach most state and local police, and Sally Yates said only that she expected the FBI to revise its agreements; what any revised version says has not been made public, as far as we could find.
Where it stands (for now)
Declassified. Police use of cell-site simulators, FBI agreements demanding secrecy and allowing dismissals, warrantless use in Erie County and Baltimore, and the RCMP’s six non-compliant deployments are all on the record. What stays out of view is how often the secrecy clause was used, and how local equipment is set.
Sources
- Document Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology · US Department of Justice · Sept. 2, 2015
- News New Cellphone Surveillance Safeguards Imposed On Federal Law Enforcement · NPR (via KPBS) · Sept. 2, 2015
- News NYCLU-Obtained Documents Reveal Secrecy, Lack of Court Oversight in Use of Invasive Stingray Technology · ACLU / New York Civil Liberties Union · April 6, 2015
- News Baltimore cops often surveil cellphones amid U.S. secrecy · The Daily Record (Associated Press) · April 8, 2015
- Document Cell site simulators used by RCMP not capable of intercepting private communication · Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
More: the case files, every source behind every story.